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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
ALEEM V. ALEEM : A DIVORCE FROM THE PROPER COMITY
STANDARD—LOWERING THE BAR THAT COURTS
MUST REACH TO DENY RECOGNIZING
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
RAJNI K. SEKHRI*
In Aleem v. Aleem,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals denied comity2
to Irfan Aleem’s Pakistani divorce, talaq, and by doing so found that
his wife was entitled to half of his pension under Maryland law, de-
spite contrary Pakistani law.3  In so holding, the court erred in its sub-
stantive comity discussion because it failed to demonstrate that
Pakistan’s title-based property disposition scheme was repugnant to
Maryland public policy.4  In denying comity to Irfan’s talaq based on a
property division analysis, the Aleem court lowered the threshold that
Maryland courts must pass in order to deny comity to judgments of
foreign nations.5  Instead, the court could have arrived at the same
result without engaging in a flawed comity discussion by grounding its
decision in the State’s jurisdictional authority to equitably divide the
Aleems’ marital property.6
Copyright  2009 by Rajni K. Sekhri.
* Rajni K. Sekhri is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law
where she is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author wishes to thank a
number of people for their assistance in creating this Note.  She owes much gratitude to
The Honorable John F. Fader II for sharing his estimable legal expertise and for engaging
her in conversations crucial to the development of this piece.  The author is indebted to
Ms. Janet Sinder, Associate Director for Research Services, Thurgood Marshall Law Li-
brary, for her assistance in researching Pakistani family law and locating obscure interna-
tional resources.  She is also sincerely grateful to Kerry T. Cooperman for his invaluable
guidance, encouragement, and painstaking editing.  Finally, the author expresses deep ap-
preciation to Heather R. Pruger for her diligent reviews, suggestions, and instrumental
support.
1. 404 Md. 404, 947 A.2d 489 (2008).
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined comity as one nation recog-
nizing “the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.”  Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
3. See Aleem, 404 Md. at 424–25, 947 A.2d at 501–02.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
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I. THE CASE
On July 16, 1980, in Karachi, Pakistan, twenty-nine year old Irfan
Aleem and eighteen year old Farah Aleem entered into a marriage
arranged by their families.7  Per Pakistani custom, Farah signed a
“marriage contract.”8  After they wed, the couple relocated to England
for four years so that Irfan could complete his doctoral studies at Ox-
ford University.9  The couple then moved to the United States, where
they have resided in Maryland for over twenty years.10  They remain
nationals of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.11  While married, Irfan
worked at the World Bank.12
On March 3, 2003, Farah filed a complaint in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, Maryland, seeking a limited divorce13 from
her husband.14  Irfan then filed an Answer and Counterclaim.15  Four
months later, Irfan went to the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
where he performed talaq, the procedure for divorce under tradi-
tional Muslim law, by signing and notarizing a “Divorce Deed” before
two witnesses.16
7. Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663, 666, 931 A.2d 1123, 1125 (2007), aff’d, 404 Md.
404, 947 A.2d 489 (2008).
8. Aleem, 404 Md. at 408, 947 A.2d at 491.  Aside from providing that Irfan owed a
deferred dower of 51,000 rupees, id. at 410–11, 947 A.2d at 493–94, the marriage contract
did not otherwise include an express or implied waiver of either Irfan’s or Farah’s respec-
tive property rights, id. at 411, 947 A.2d at 494.
9. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 666, 931 A.2d at 1125.  Notably, “[t]he parties never lived
together in Pakistan.” Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at  664, 931 A.2d at 1124.
12. Id. at  667, 931 A.2d at 1126.  During this time, Farah was mainly a homemaker, and
her tasks included caring for Irfan, the couple’s children, and the household.  Id.  After
resolving her immigration limitations and receiving permission from the World Bank to
work, Farah worked in Virginia for four and one-half years. Id.  Now a permanent resident
of Maryland with her own green card, she currently works for Profitable Association in
Washington, D.C. Id.
13. Id.  A limited divorce “ends the legal relationship of marriage by court order but
does not address financial support, property distribution, or care and custody of children.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 516 (8th ed. 2004).
14. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 667, 931 A.2d at 1126.
15. Id.  Irfan’s Answer did not raise any jurisdictional objections. Id.
16. Id. at 665, 668, 931 A.2d at 1124, 1126.  The “Divorce Deed” stated:
Now this deed witnesses that I the said Irfan Aleem, do hereby divorce Farah
Aleem, daughter of Mahmood Mirza, by pronouncing upon her Divorce/Talaq
three times irrevocably and by severing all connections of husband and wife with
her forever and for good.
1. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem.
2. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem.
3. I Divorce thee Farah Aleem.
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After three trials, the circuit court held that Irfan’s talaq would
not receive comity and granted an absolute divorce to Farah.17  The
trial judge refused to allow Irfan to apply for a divorce based on talaq,
finding the idea “offens[ive to the court] in terms of how a divorce is
granted.”18  The court then arranged an equitable division of the par-
ties’ marital property and ordered Irfan to pay Farah 50% of his
monthly pension from the World Bank until the death of either
party.19
Irfan then moved to alter the court’s judgment.20  Under Pakis-
tani law, he contended, a wife cannot claim money, property, or assets
that are titled in her husband’s name on the date of divorce, unless
the marriage contract grants that right.21  Irfan stressed that his World
Bank pension was an asset, and that the written marriage agreement
did not expressly give Farah a right to it.22  The circuit court denied
Irfan’s motion, and he appealed.23
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision
of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court correctly declined to
apply Pakistani law when determining Farah’s right to marital prop-
erty titled under Irfan’s name.24  The court agreed with Irfan that
Id. at 668, 931 A.2d at 1126.  Farah was served this deed, a letter from Irfan regarding
notice under § 7.1 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 of Pakistan, and a check for
$2,500. Id.
17. Id. at 670–71, 931 A.2d at 1127–28.  An “absolute divorce” is a “total divorce of
husband and wife, dissolving the marriage tie and releasing the parties wholly from their
matrimonial obligations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (8th ed. 2004).  The court granted
Farah an absolute divorce based on a two-year separation.  Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 671, 931
A.2d at 1128.
18. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 670, 931 A.2d at 1127.  The Court of Special Appeals did not
explain why the trial court found Irfan’s talaq offensive. See id. (finding, without explana-
tion, that talaq “offends the notions of this Court”).
19. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 664, 671, 931 A.2d at 1124, 1128; see also Aleem v. Aleem,
404 Md. 404, 422, 947 A.2d 489, 500 (2008) (defining “[m]arital property” as property
parties acquire during their marriage).  Irfan’s pension would be drawn from his Staff
Retirement Plan, Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 671, 931 A.2d at 1128, and was valued at approxi-
mately one million dollars, Aleem, 404 Md. at 407 n.2, 947 A.2d at 490 n.2.  The court
considered his pension marital property because Irfan worked at the World Bank during
his marriage. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 671 n.5, 931 A.2d at 1128 n.5.  Marital property also
included “real property valued at $850,000, personal property valued at approximately
$80,000, and two or more vehicles.” Aleem, 404 Md. at 407 n.2, 947 A.2d at 491 n.2.
20. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 671, 931 A.2d at 1128.
21. Id. at 671–72, 931 A.2d at 1128.
22. Id. at 672, 931 A.2d at 1128–29.  Rather, under the marriage contract, Irfan
claimed that he owed his wife only a deferred dower of 51,000 rupees, or approximately
$2,500. Aleem, 404 Md. at 410–11 & n.5, 947 A.2d at 493–94 & n.5.
23. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 672, 931 A.2d at 1129.  Specifically, Irfan argued that the
circuit court was required to receive evidence relating to his talaq divorce. Id.
24. Id. at 683, 931 A.2d at 1135.
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under a silent marriage contract governed by Pakistani law, the “de-
fault” rule is that a wife has no right to property titled in her hus-
band’s name.25  Under Maryland law, however, the “default” rule is
that a wife has a right to that property, even when premarital or post-
marital agreements are silent as to this issue.26  The court found that
these “default rules” conflicted to such a degree that granting comity
to Irfan’s talaq contravened Maryland public policy.27  The court ex-
plained that Maryland public policy requires “ ‘fair[ ] and
equitabl[e]’” distribution of property upon divorce.28
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the Court of Special Appeals had ignored “fundamental
principles of international comity and conflicts of laws” in its decisions
(1) to refuse to recognize Irfan’s talaq because Pakistan and Maryland
apply different “default rules” in dividing marital property between
spouses, and (2) to rule that Pakistan lacked jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage because the parties resided in Maryland on diplomatic
visas.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland courts presume that foreign judgments are entitled to
comity unless a judgment is repugnant to Maryland public policy.30
Under Pakistani law, a husband may divorce his wife by initiating talaq
against her, after which property will either follow the possessor of its
title or be awarded in accordance with the parties’ marriage con-
tract.31  By contrast, a Maryland court will equitably divide marital
property upon divorce, unless the parties enter into a valid agreement
that excludes marital property subject to distribution.32
25. Id. at 681, 931 A.2d at 1134.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 683, 931 A.2d at 1135 (quoting Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws
2304, 2305).
29. Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 408, 947 A.2d 489, 491 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Maryland Courts Presume that a Foreign Judgment Is Entitled to
Comity Unless that Judgment Is Repugnant to the State’s Public
Policy
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,33 which requires U.S. courts to recognize judgments of sister
states,34 is inapplicable to judgments of foreign countries.35  Thus,
while Maryland affords full faith and credit to judgments from other
states as long as the rendering court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties,36 the judiciary need not grant comity to for-
eign judgments that are contrary to Maryland public policy.37
Maryland has codified its principles of comity, including the pub-
lic policy exception, in the Maryland Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act (“Act”).38  The Act provides that, with certain
exceptions, a foreign judgment that “grants or denies recovery of a
sum of money” is enforceable in the same manner as a sister state’s
judgment would be enforceable under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.39  The Act offers both mandatory and discretionary exceptions
to granting comity.40  For example, the Act states that “[a] foreign
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
34. Id.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Id.  Before the Ameri-
can Revolution, states deemed judgments from other states as foreign and could review
both the jurisdiction of their sister states as well as the merits of their judgments.  Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181 (1895).  Following the Revolution, the United States required
states to grant full faith and credit to one another’s judgments. Id. (“‘Full faith and credit
should be given to the judgments of one of the States of the Union in the courts of another
of these States.’” (quoting Articles of Confederation, art. 4 § 3 (U.S. 1777))).
35. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227 (“The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears
to us to be that judgments rendered . . . in any other foreign country . . . are not entitled to
full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country.”).
36. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 577 n.13, 702 A.2d 230, 238 n.13 (1997).
37. Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 177–78, 389 A.2d 413, 418 (1978) (quoting
Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 295 A.2d 519, 521–22 (Conn. 1972)).
38. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 10-701–10-709 (LexisNexis 2006) (effective 1963). See Andes v. Versant Corp.,
878 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to foreign judgments, a foreign money judgment
“‘is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit’” in Maryland (quoting Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act § 10-703)); Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 575–76, 702 A.2d at 237 (observing that Maryland
has codified its principles underlying comity in the Act).
39. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 10-703.
40. Id. § 10-704; see infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text; see also Telnikoff, 347 Md. R
at 609, 702 A.2d at 254 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the Act provides four mandatory
reasons why a judgment cannot be recognized and five discretionary reasons why a state
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judgment is not conclusive” if fraudulently obtained or if the granting
foreign court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction.41  The Act
permits Maryland courts to take a discretionary approach when recog-
nizing foreign judgments in other situations, explaining that “[a] for-
eign judgment need not be recognized” where, inter alia, the
judgment is “repugnant to the public policy of the State.”42
Maryland’s stance on comity is rooted in the Supreme Court of
the United States’ decision in Hilton v. Guyot.43  In Hilton, a French
manufacturing firm sued its trading partners, who were citizens of the
United States and of the State of New York, in a French court over
disputed commercial dealings.44  The defendants then sold their
property located in France, rendering the plaintiff unable to collect
on its judgment.45  Because the defendants were citizens of New York,
the plaintiff was able to recover its judgment in a New York court.46
When the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, however, the
may refuse to recognize a foreign judgment.” (citing Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v.
Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1987))).
41. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 10-704(a).  The Act states
the following mandatory exceptions to granting comity to a foreign money judgment:
(a) . . .  A foreign judgment is not conclusive if:
(1) The judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
(3) The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter; or
(4) The judgment was obtained by fraud.
Id.
42. Id. § 10-704(b)(2).  The Act provides the following discretionary exceptions to af-
fording comity to a foreign money judgment:
(b)  A foreign judgment need not be recognized if:
(1) The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice
of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) The cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the pub-
lic policy of the State;
(3) The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(4) The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between
the parties under which the dispute was to be settled out of court; or
(5) In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court
was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
Id. § 10-704(b).
43. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
44. Id. at 114–15.  The firm conducted business in cities including New York and Paris.
Id. at 114.
45. Id. at 116.
46. Id. at 114, 122.  Refusing to admit any evidence the defendants offered, the New
York court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of the French judgment. Id.
at 122.
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Court reversed the judgment of the New York court and declined to
hold the French judgment conclusive.47
The Hilton Court first defined comity as “one nation al-
low[ing] . . . the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another na-
tion.”48  Then, the Court explained that granting comity is “neither a
matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy.”49  While judg-
ments rendered in foreign countries “are not entitled to full credit
and conclusive effect” in the United States,50 foreign judgments serve
as prima facie evidence of the merit of the plaintiff’s claim.51  The
Court stressed that comity is grounded in “mutuality and reciprocity,”
and found that France failed to comport with these principles because
a French court would not have recognized a United States judgment
before holding a trial on the merits.52  The Court reversed the French
judgment and ordered a new trial.53
In 1979, Maryland wrestled with comity in Wolff v. Wolff,54 in
which a resident of England asked the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland, to enforce the alimony provisions of an English
divorce decree.55  Her husband, a Maryland resident, contended that
the court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction.56  Before
dismissing the husband’s jurisdictional challenges, the Wolff court
stressed that a foreign judgment is presumed valid absent evidence to
the contrary, and that comity entitles a foreign divorce decree to “‘full
force and effect’” in another nation.57  The court explained that be-
cause Maryland considers the obligation to pay alimony sound public
policy, state courts should be able to equitably enforce the alimony
47. Id. at 228–29.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 163–64.
50. Id. at 227.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 228.
53. Id. at 229.
54. 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (1978), aff’d, 285 Md. 185, 401 A.2d 479 (1979) (per
curiam).
55. Id. at 169, 389 A.2d at 414.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 177–78, 184, 389 A.2d at 418–19, 422 (quoting Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 295 A.2d
519, 522 (Conn. 1972)).  While the Wolff court observed that equity courts have jurisdiction
to enforce alimony provisions of foreign divorce decrees, the court also permitted the hus-
band to demonstrate that the English decree itself was illegal. Id. at 184, 389 A.2d at 422.
The court explained that the United States will not afford comity to foreign divorce de-
crees where the following factors apply: (1) the foreign court lacked jurisdiction; (2) the
foreign proceedings denied due process of law; or (3) the divorce decree offends a state’s
public policy. Id. at 178, 389 A.2d at 419.
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provisions of a foreign divorce decree.58  Thus, the Wolff court held
that comity principles entitled the Maryland circuit court to exercise
jurisdiction over the foreign judgment.59
Following Wolff, Maryland addressed comity issues specific to
Pakistani family law in the twin cases of Malik v. Malik (Malik I)60 and
Hosain v. Malik (Malik II).61  The parties in Malik I, both citizens of
Pakistan, married in Pakistan in 1982 and had a child soon thereaf-
ter.62  In 1990, the mother fled Pakistan with the child.63  Although a
Pakistani court awarded custody to the father, he was unable to locate
the mother and child until two years later when he found them in
Baltimore County, Maryland.64  Once discovered, the mother re-
quested an order for custody of the child in a Maryland circuit
court.65  The trial judge determined that the circuit court had jurisdic-
tion to determine custody, and refused to grant comity to the Pakis-
tani custody order.66  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals
remanded the case to determine whether the Pakistani court had ap-
plied Maryland’s “best interest of the child” standard.67  The Malik I
court held that, unless the Pakistani court had applied law so contrary
to Maryland public policy as to undermine the outcome of the case,
the Pakistani custody order was “presumed to be correct.”68  On re-
mand, the circuit court granted comity to the Pakistani custody
order.69
In Malik II, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit
court’s decision to recognize the Pakistani judgment.70  The court
concluded that the Pakistani court applied the “best interest of the
child” standard, and that Pakistani child custody law did not contra-
vene Maryland public policy.71  The Malik II court rejected the
58. Id. at 182, 389 A.2d at 421.
59. Id. at 178, 389 A.2d at 419.  The Court of Appeals adopted the Wolff opinion as its
own and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Wolff v. Wolff, 285 Md.
185, 186, 401 A.2d 479, 479 (1979) (per curiam).
60. 99 Md. App. 521, 638 A.2d 1184 (1994).
61. 108 Md. App. 284, 671 A.2d 988 (1996).
62. Malik I, 99 Md. App. at 523–24, 638 A.2d at 1185.
63. Id. at 524, 638 A.2d at 1185.
64. Id., 638 A.2d at 1186.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 536, 638 A.2d at 1191.
68. Id.  The Malik I court reasoned that a Maryland court should not decline to enforce
a Pakistani custody order merely because Pakistani law has a parental preference when
determining custody and Maryland does not. Id. at 535, 638 A.2d at 1191.
69. Hosain v. Malik (Malik II), 108 Md. App. 284, 293, 671 A.2d 988, 992 (1996).
70. Id. at 332, 671 A.2d at 1011.
71. Id. at 315, 671 A.2d at 1003.
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mother’s argument that the Pakistani doctrine governing child cus-
tody, which strongly prefers paternal custody, was so “repugnant” to
Maryland law as to deny comity.72  The court justified its recognition
of Pakistani custody law by reasoning that a Maryland court would not
refuse to enforce custody awards from states that still employ a paren-
tal preference in custody disputes.73
One year later, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided the
State’s  leading case on comity, Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.74  In Telnikoff,
Matusevitch wrote an allegedly libelous letter in response to an article
that Telnikoff authored.75  After a newspaper published the letter,
Telnikoff obtained a libel judgment against Matusevitch in a British
court.76  Telnikoff then attempted to enforce his judgment in Mary-
land.77  The Court of Appeals declined to grant comity, explaining
that England’s defamation laws contravened Maryland’s public policy
of freedom of the press.78  The court disapproved of Telnikoff’s ability
to recover under the English judgment without proving that Ma-
tusevitch acted maliciously, or even negligently, which is the mini-
mum standard under Maryland defamation law.79  Under Maryland’s
Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act,80 the court
found Telnikoff’s English libel judgment “repugnant” to State public
72. Id. at 316–17, 671 A.2d at 1003–04.  Under Pakistan’s Islamic doctrine of child
custody, Hazanit, a mother has custody of her male child until he is seven years old and of
her female child until she reaches puberty. Id., 671 A.2d at 1004.  Once the child reaches
the requisite age, the father and his male relatives control custody. See id. at 316, 671 A.2d
at 1004.  The Malik II court found that Hazanit is only one factor a Pakistani court consid-
ers when determining the welfare of the child. Id. at 317–18, 671 A.2d at 1004.
73. Id. at 318, 671 A.2d at 1004–05.  The court explained that Pakistan’s child custody
doctrine is “no more objectionable than any other type of [parental] preference.” Id., 671
A.2d at 1005.  For example, four states—Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee—
maintained a maternal preference in child custody disputes.  Malik v. Malik (Malik I), 99
Md. App. 521, 535, 638 A.2d 1184, 1191 (1994).
74. 347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230 (1997).
75. Id. at 564–67, 702 A.2d at 232–33.
76. Id. at 568, 571, 702 A.2d at 233–35.
77. Id. at 571–72, 702 A.2d at 235.
78. Id. at 599–600, 602, 702 A.2d at 249, 251.  The court observed that England’s libel
laws are so advantageous to plaintiffs that persons who receive negative press in publica-
tions in the United States choose to file libel actions in England “‘even when the plaintiffs
and the publication have little connection to that country.’” Id. at 601–02, 702 A.2d at 250
(quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.03[3] (1996)).
79. Id. at 598–99, 702 A.2d at 249.  In addition, the court disapproved of Telnikoff’s
ability to obtain a libel judgment absent proof that Matusevitch’s letter included a false
statement of fact, which Maryland law requires, or even a defamatory fact statement. Id. at
599, 702 A.2d at 249.
80. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 10-701–10-709 (LexisNexis 2006).
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policy.81  Drawing from Hilton, the majority explained that although
foreign judgments merit a “degree of deference and respect” under
principles of comity, courts will not recognize foreign judgments that
are inconsistent with the State’s public policies.82
B. Marriage and Divorce in Pakistan
In Pakistan, marriage is a contract.83  In order to marry, potential
spouses must fulfill the requirements of a valid contract, such as hav-
ing the required contractual capacity.84  The Muslim Family Laws Or-
dinance, 1961 (“Ordinance”), governs marriage and divorce in
Pakistan.85  The Ordinance applies to all Muslim citizens of Paki-
stan.86  Thus, under the Ordinance, “Pakistani law” and “Muslim law”
may be read as synonymous.87  A couple in Pakistan cannot register a
Muslim marriage unless the marriage accords with the Ordinance.88
The Ordinance permits a husband to divorce his wife by using
talaq against her.89  Under traditional Muslim law, a man uses talaq by
thrice announcing that he repudiates his wife.90  No formalities are
necessary, and a husband may use talaq “without showing cause and
without recourse to a court of law.”91  This is called a “bare talaq” and
is instantly effective and irrevocable,92 although Pakistan also requires
the husband to send notice of his talaq to a chairman of an arbitration
council to reconcile the parties.93  The parties are not required to at-
81. Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 600, 702 A.2d at 249 (quoting Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act § 10-704(b)(2)).
82. Id. at 574–75, 702 A.2d at 237.
83. A HANDBOOK ON FAMILY LAW IN PAKISTAN 35 (Cassandra Balchin ed., 1994).
84. Id.
85. See Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, § 3(1), reprinted in KEITH HODKINSON,
MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 96, 96 (1984) [hereinafter Muslim Family Laws Ordi-
nance] (“The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any law, cus-
tom or usage, and the registration of Muslim marriages shall take place only in accordance
with those provisions.”); In re Fatima, (1986) A.C. 527, 531 (H.L.) (“In Pakistan the law
relating to divorce is the Islamic law as modified by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance
1961.”).
86. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, supra note 85, § 1(2). R
87. See id. (providing that the Ordinance “extends to the whole of Pakistan, and applies
to all Muslim citizens of Pakistan, wherever they may be”).
88. Id. § 3(1).
89. Id. § 7(1).
90. In re Fatima, (1986) A.C. 527, 531 (H.L.).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, supra note 85, § 7(1), (4).  A husband who does R
not give notice of his talaq to the chairman is subject to imprisonment for up to one year, a
fine of up to 5,000 rupees, or both. Id. § 7(2).
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tend the arbitration council, however.94  If the parties do not wish to
reunite, their divorce will become effective ninety days from the date
the chairman received notice of the talaq.95
Under Pakistani law, property follows the possessor of its title
upon divorce.96  Spouses may inherit property from each other, but
neither acquires a marital interest in the other spouse’s property.97
This principle is due to the influence of the Holy Quran98 to improve
the status of women in early Muslim society99 by granting a woman the
right to own and manage her own property even upon divorce.100
The Pakistani title-based property scheme has been upheld in the
United States, notably in the New Jersey case, Chaudry v. Chaudry.101
The Chaudrys, both citizens of Pakistan, married in Pakistan in
1961.102  In 1966, the family moved to New Jersey after the husband
obtained a job there as a psychiatrist.103  Along with their two chil-
dren, the wife returned to Pakistan in 1968 with the intention of per-
manently residing there.104  In 1974, the husband obtained a Pakistani
divorce, talaq, against his wife.105  Before a Pakistani court confirmed
the husband’s talaq, the wife sued for divorce in New Jersey and de-
manded equitable distribution of marital property.106  Finding that
the validity of the divorce had been “amply litigated” in Pakistan, the
New Jersey Superior Court upheld the husband’s talaq.107  The court
found that the Chaudrys’ marriage lacked sufficient “nexus” to New
Jersey for its courts to award the wife equitable distribution of prop-
erty because the wife and children resided there for merely two
years.108  The Chaudry court added that the wife was also foreclosed
94. In re Fatima, (1986) A.C. 527, 532 (H.L.).
95. Id.  This ninety-day period is suspended if the wife is pregnant. Id.
96. JOHN L. ESPOSITO WITH NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 23
(2d ed. 2001).
97. Id.
98. The Holy Quran, the source text for Islam, is a collection of divine revelations from
the early seventh century. HODKINSON, supra note 85, at 3. R
99. ESPOSITO, supra note 96, at 4.  The primary areas of Quaranic reform included mar- R
riage, divorce, and inheritance in Muslim society. Id.
100. Id. at 23.
101. 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
102. Id. at 1003.
103. Id. at 1004.  From 1963 to 1966, the Chaudrys lived in Connecticut with their chil-
dren. Id.
104. Id.  The wife claimed that her husband had reassured her he would permanently
rejoin the family in Pakistan after he completed his medical examination, at which time his
visa would expire. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1005–06.
107. Id. at 1005.
108. Id. at 1006.
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from equitable division of property because the parties married in Pa-
kistan, where they negotiated their marriage contract, which did not
contain a provision granting the wife an interest in her husband’s
property.109
C. Maryland Courts Subject Marital Property to Equitable Distribution
upon Divorce Absent a Valid Agreement to the Contrary
Under Maryland law, a spouse can file for either a limited di-
vorce110 or an absolute divorce.111  A limited divorce “ends the legal
relationship of marriage . . . but does not address financial support,
property distribution, or care and custody of children.”112  A court
may grant a limited divorce temporarily or indefinitely.113  An abso-
lute divorce dissolves the marriage completely, “releasing the parties
wholly from their matrimonial obligations.”114
Upon annulment or absolute divorce, a Maryland court will de-
termine which property is marital property.115  “Marital property” is
property that one or both spouses acquired during the marriage, re-
gardless of how it is titled.116  After valuing the marital property,117 the
court takes into account several factors, such as the monetary and
nonmonetary contributions each party made to the family, the dura-
tion of the marriage, and any other factor that the court considers
“necessary or appropriate” so that the court can “arrive at a fair and
equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property.”118  Ma-
ryland public policy is that “the property interests of the spouses
109. Id.
110. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-102 (LexisNexis 2006).
111. Id. § 7-103.
112. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 516 (8th ed. 2004).
113. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-102(c).
114. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 515 (8th ed. 2004).
115. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-203(a).
116. Id. § 8-201(e)(1).
117. Id. § 8-204(a).
118. Id. § 8-205 (emphasis added).  The court considers the following factors:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being
of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property described in
subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort expended by
each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in property de-
scribed in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
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should be adjusted fairly and equitably.”119  If the parties do not wish
for a court to classify their property as “marital” and thus subject to
equitable distribution, they may exclude that property by valid agree-
ment.120  Maryland is one of several United States jurisdictions that
allow spouses to enter into agreements preventing a court from divid-
ing property upon divorce.121
Maryland considers pension, retirement, profit sharing, and de-
ferred compensation plans to be “marital property,” and these plans
may be excluded by valid agreement just like other types of property
under State law.122  For example, in Cannon v. Cannon,123 after discuss-
ing Maryland’s standard for evaluating premarital agreements,124 the
Court of Appeals upheld a premarital contract that classified retire-
ment benefits as “separate property of the other party.”125
If a foreign court grants an annulment or divorce, Maryland may
nevertheless exercise its statutory authority to equitably distribute
marital property under Maryland law if the following twin prongs are
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this
subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the
entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has
made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to con-
sider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an
interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
Id. § 8-205(b).
119. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2305.  This portion of the Act
remains uncodified.
120. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-201(e)(3)(iii) (explaining that “marital property”
does not include property “excluded by valid agreement”).
121. Compare id. (providing that parties may agree to exclude property as non-marital),
with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-113(2)(d) (West 2005) (explaining that “marital prop-
erty” may be excluded by valid agreement of the spouses), and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:16-a(II)(k) (2007) (noting that property is subject to equitable distribution upon
divorce unless the value of that property is “allocated by a valid prenuptial contract”), and
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-501 (2005) (providing that spouses may enter into binding pre-
nuptial agreements regarding property owned by either party).
122. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-204.
123. 384 Md. 537, 865 A.2d 563 (2005).
124. See id. at 553–69, 865 A.2d at 572–81.  The Cannon court explained that a con-
testing party can attack a premarital agreement on the basis of “fraud, duress, coercion,
mistake, undue influence, or a party’s incompetence.” Id. at 554, 865 A.2d at 572.  The
court added that parties to a premarital agreement have a “confidential relationship,”
which requires each party to make a “frank, full, and truthful financial disclosure.”  Id. at
570–71, 865 A.2d at 582–83.
125. Id. at 545, 547 n.3, 865 A.2d at 567, 568–69 n.3.  The premarital agreement also
included provisions that, inter alia, preserved personal property to each party according to
title, mutually waived alimony if the Cannons divorced, and preserved Mr. Cannon’s right
over the home. Id. at 548, 865 A.2d at 569.
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met: “(1) 1 of the parties was domiciled in [Maryland] when the for-
eign proceeding was commenced; and (2) the court in the other juris-
diction lacked or did not exercise personal jurisdiction over the party
domiciled in [Maryland] or jurisdiction over the property at issue.”126
For example, in Randolph v. Randolph,127 the wife filed for divorce
against her husband in Maryland, requesting that the court determine
the parties’ marital property and grant a monetary award.128  The hus-
band, who was domiciled in Virginia, obtained a divorce in Virginia
while the Maryland divorce action was pending.129  The Maryland cir-
cuit court found that the Virginia divorce “did not resolve any of the
other issues between the parties” and granted a monetary award
under Maryland statute.130  The Court of Special Appeals held that
the trial court had jurisdiction to make an award even in light of the
Virginia divorce.131  Thus, Maryland courts have the statutory ability to
resolve subsequent issues that arise after a foreign court grants a
divorce.132
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Aleem v. Aleem, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and held that, because the
talaq that Irfan Aleem performed under Pakistani law was not entitled
to comity, the court could categorize his pension as marital property
subject to equitable distribution under Maryland law.133  Writing for
the unanimous court, Judge Cathell first drew from Hilton v. Guyot,
noting that the United States is not obliged to grant comity to foreign
law.134  The court explained that because the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution is inapplicable to foreign
judgments,135 a state need not grant comity to a foreign judgment that
126. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-212.
127. 67 Md. App. 577, 508 A.2d 996 (1986).
128. Id. at 579, 508 A.2d at 997.
129. Id. at 580, 508 A.2d at 997.
130. Id.  The trial court granted a monetary award to the wife under § 8-205 of Mary-
land’s Family Law Article. Id.
131. Id. at 583–84, 508 A.2d at 999.  The Randolph court remanded the case and directed
the circuit court to first determine the value of the marital property at issue before
“grant[ing a] monetary award as it then deems appropriate.” Id. at 587, 508 A.2d at 1001.
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. R
133. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 424–26, 947 A.2d 489, 501–02 (2008).
134. Id. at 413, 947 A.2d at 495 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)).
The court highlighted the Hilton principle that the United States will not recognize a for-
eign judgment altering an individual’s marital status, “ ‘such as a decree . . . dissolving a
marriage,’” that is contrary to public policy. Id. (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 167).
135. Id. at 415, 947 A.2d at 496 (quoting Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 149 (4th
Cir. 1989)).
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conflicts with that state’s public policy.136  The court acknowledged
that it relied on the doctrine of comity between states to support its
position on comity between Maryland and foreign countries, adding
that “[t]he doctrine . . . is the same in both instances.”137
Next, the court observed that Maryland public policy requires the
State to equitably distribute property that spouses acquire during mar-
riage.138  By contrast, courts applying Pakistani law do not equitably
divide marital property unless the initial marriage contract provides
for this division.139 The Aleem court found that Pakistani law establish-
ing title-based division of marital property clashes with Maryland law
providing equitable distribution upon divorce.140
The court also examined talaq itself, a protocol available only to a
husband unless the marriage contract extends this right to the wife.141
Thus, the court held, talaq contradicts the Constitution of Maryland,
which ensures equality of rights regardless of sex.142  Because enforc-
ing talaq would conflict with Maryland constitutional provisions, the
court explained, talaq violates Maryland public policy.143
136. Id. at 415–16, 947 A.2d at 496 (quoting Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 294 F.3d
584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002)).  The court relied on precedent to support this point. See, e.g., id.
at 419–20, 947 A.2d at 499 (“‘[C]ourts will nonetheless deny . . . those foreign judgments
which are inconsistent with the public policies of the forum state.’” (quoting Telnikoff v.
Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 574, 702 A.2d 230, 237 (1997))).
137. Id. at 418, 947 A.2d at 498.  The court’s proposition is curious because the two
comity doctrines are not identical.  Comity between states is governed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which the Aleem court itself explicitly noted is
inapplicable to foreign judgments. Id. at 415, 947 A.2d at 496 (“‘The Full Faith and Credit
Clause of Article IV § 1 of the Constitution of the United States does not apply to foreign
judgments.’” (quoting Andes, 878 F.2d at 149)).  Indeed, “the public policy exception [is
what] distinguishes the recognition of foreign judgments from the recognition of judg-
ments rendered by other jurisdictions within the United States.” Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 577
n.13, 702 A.2d at 238 n.13; see also supra Part II.A.
138. Aleem, 404 Md. at 421, 947 A.2d at 499–500.  The court drew from the uncodified
preamble to Chapter 794 of the Acts of 1978, which states that “‘the property interests of
the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably.’”  Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663,
683, 931 A.2d 1123, 1135 (2007) (emphasis removed) (quoting Act of May 29, 1978, ch.
794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2305).
139. Aleem, 404 Md. at 422, 947 A.2d at 500.
140. Id. at 424, 947 A.2d at 502.  Maryland’s Family Law Article allows courts to consider
any factor “necessary or appropriate . . . to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or
transfer of an interest in property” upon divorce. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-
205(b)(11) (LexisNexis 2006).
141. Aleem, 404 Md. at 421–22, 947 A.2d at 500.  The marriage contract in this case
granted no such right to Farah. Id. at 422, 947 A.2d at 500. The court also observed that it
appears a husband may use talaq without notifying his wife. Id.
142. Id. at 422, 947 A.2d at 500–01 (“‘Equality of rights under the law shall not be
abridged or denied because of sex.’” (quoting MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46)).
143. Id. at 422–23, 947 A.2d at 500–01.
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The Aleem court also sought to preserve Maryland public policy
arising from due process rights, opining that talaq, as a general proce-
dure, lacks due process for the wife.144  The court found that talaq
strips the wife of her due process rights when she files a divorce action
and seeks her share of marital property because her husband can per-
form talaq at the embassy of a country operating under Islamic law
before the wife can fully litigate her divorce action under Maryland
law.145  The court reasoned that this “deprivation of due process” also
violates Maryland public policy.146
Thus, the Aleem court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals,
declining to recognize Pakistani law that provides that, absent an
agreement to the contrary, property is distributed via title upon di-
vorce.147  Reiterating that Maryland public policy requires fair and eq-
uitable division of marital property upon divorce and mandates
sufficient due process, the Aleem court refused to grant comity to
Irfan’s talaq.148
The Aleem court concluded its discussion by ruling that the Court
of Special Appeals did not disregard “fundamental principles of inter-
national comity and conflicts of laws” by refusing to recognize the
Pakistani divorce, or by finding that Pakistan lacked jurisdiction to dis-
solve the marriage because the parties resided in Maryland on diplo-
matic visas.149
IV. ANALYSIS
In Aleem v. Aleem, the Court of Appeals declined to grant comity
to Irfan Aleem’s talaq, and entitled his wife to half of his pension
under Maryland’s equitable distribution scheme.150  In reaching this
outcome, the court erred in its substantive comity discussion because
it failed to establish that Pakistan’s property disposition scheme is re-
pugnant to Maryland public policy.151  Thus, in refusing to recognize
Irfan’s talaq under its comity analysis, the Aleem court lowered the stan-
dard that Maryland courts must meet in order to deny comity to for-
144. Id. at 423, 947 A.2d at 501.
145. Id.  A husband can only perform talaq in Maryland, however, if he is a citizen of a
country in which Islamic law has also been adopted as civil law. Id.
146. Id. The court promptly dismissed Irfan’s argument that Pakistan has a Council of
Arbitration available to the wife, explaining that the procedure applies only if the parties
wish to reconcile, which was not the case here. Id.
147. Id. at 425, 947 A.2d at 502.
148. Id. at 425–26, 947 A.2d at 502.
149. See id. at 408, 426, 947 A.2d at 491, 502.
150. See id. at 424–25, 947 A.2d at 501–02.
151. See infra Part IV.A.
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eign judgments.152  Instead of engaging in its flawed comity
discussion, the court could have reached the same result under the
State’s jurisdictional authority to equitably divide marital property
upon divorce.153
A. The Aleem Court Failed to Establish that Pakistan’s Property
Division Scheme Is Repugnant to Maryland Public Policy
In granting Farah a marital interest in Irfan’s pension, the Aleem
court erred in its substantive analysis to deny comity to Irfan’s talaq.
The court failed to show that Pakistan’s title-based property scheme
was repugnant to Maryland public policy,154 the State’s standard to
deny comity to a foreign judgment.  Additionally, the court erred
when criticizing Irfan’s talaq on the grounds of gender equality be-
cause talaq itself was not at issue and, more importantly, talaq does not
discriminate between the sexes vis-a`-vis property disposition.155
1. Pakistan’s Title-Based Property Disposition Scheme Is Not
Repugnant to Maryland Public Policy
In analyzing the effect of talaq on property disposition upon di-
vorce, the Aleem court failed to reach the high bar Maryland has set for
refusal to recognize a foreign judgment.  To overcome the presump-
tion of granting comity to a foreign judgment, that judgment must be
repugnant to Maryland public policy.156  Pakistan’s default title-based
property distribution scheme, an approach that Maryland law explic-
itly permits couples to achieve by contract, does not meet this
standard.
In addition to case law, the “repugnant” factor is found in Mary-
land’s Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.157  Al-
though the Act excludes matrimonial or family law judgments from
152. See infra Part IV.B.
153. See infra Part IV.C.
154. See infra Part IV.A.1.
155. See infra Part IV.A.2.
156. See infra notes 157–165 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF R
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117(c) (1971) (explaining that foreign judgments will usually be en-
forced “except in situations where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions
of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought”).
157. See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-704(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining that a court may decline to rec-
ognize a foreign judgment if, inter alia, “[t]he cause of action on which the judgment is
based is repugnant to the public policy of the State” (emphasis added)).
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the umbrella of foreign judgments,158 Maryland courts nevertheless
have applied principles from the Act to foreign family law judgments.
In Wolff v. Wolff,159 the Court of Special Appeals found that because
the Act was meant to “promote principles of international comity,”160
it did not prevent the Maryland circuit court from recognizing the
alimony provisions of an English divorce decree.161  Similarly, in Malik
I,162 the Court of Special Appeals directed the circuit court to apply
the repugnancy factor in determining whether to extend comity to
Pakistan’s custody order.163  The circuit court recognized the Pakis-
tani judgment,164 and the Court of Special Appeals in Malik II af-
firmed on the grounds that the custody order was not “‘repugnant to
Maryland public policy.’”165
The Aleem court would not have contravened the public policy of
Maryland, or the rest of the nation, had it recognized Pakistan’s title-
based property division scheme triggered by Irfan’s talaq.  In Telnikoff
v. Matusevitch,166 the Court of Appeals found that granting comity to
an English libel judgment under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Act would be “repugnant” only because the defamation laws of
Maryland and England are “totally different . . . in virtually every sig-
nificant respect.”167  In this case, however, the laws of Maryland and
Pakistan on property disposition are not so dissimilar as to render
Pakistani law repugnant to Maryland public policy.  Under Pakistani
law, a couple may avoid the “default” title-based rule by contracting
158. Id. § 10-701(b) (defining “foreign judgment” as “any judgment of a foreign state
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money” and excluding “judgment[s] for taxes,
fine, or penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters”).
159. 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (1978), aff’d, 285 Md. 185, 401 A.2d 479 (1979).
160. Id. at 175, 389 A.2d at 417.  The Wolff court reasoned that because the Act did not
preclude a court from recognizing a foreign judgment in situations not enumerated by the
statute, see id. at 171–72, 389 A.2d at 415–16, the legislature intended for the Act to be read
expansively, id. at 172, 389 A.2d at 416.
161. Id. at 171, 389 A.2d at 415.
162. 99 Md. App. 521, 638 A.2d 1184 (1994).
163. Id. at 534–35, 638 A.2d at 1191.
164. Hosain v. Malik (Malik II), 108 Md. App. 284, 293, 671 A.2d 988, 992 (1996).
165. Id. at 316, 671 A.2d at 1003 (quoting Malik I, 99 Md. App. at 534, 638 A.2d at 1191).
166. 347 Md. 561, 702 A.2d 230 (1997).
167. Id. at 572–73, 598, 702 A.2d at 236, 248.  The court noted that these dissimilarities
stemmed from “historic and fundamental public policy differences concerning freedom of
the press and speech.” Id. at 598, 702 A.2d at 248.  Troubled, the court pointed out that
English law did not require Telnikoff to prove that Matusevitch’s allegedly libelous letter
contained a false statement of fact, which Maryland law requires. Id. at 599, 702 A.2d at
249.
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around it,168 even though Irfan and Farah chose not to do so.169  Simi-
larly, under Maryland law, a couple may contract around Maryland’s
“default” equitable distribution rule by entering into a valid agree-
ment that excludes property as marital property subject to equitable
distribution.170  The fact that a Maryland couple may achieve the same
title-based property result by contract as a Pakistani couple achieves by
“default” contravenes the argument that the Pakistani law is repug-
nant to State public policy.171
Moreover, in Malik II,172 the Court of Special Appeals found that
Pakistani family law, even when assuming an opposing stance from
Maryland law, does not justify the denial of comity to Pakistani legal
schemes.173  In upholding a child custody order governed by Paki-
stan’s parental preference doctrine,174 the Malik II court first ex-
plained that not only does Maryland lack a parental preference, but
even when the State once applied such a preference, Pakistan’s cur-
rent child custody doctrine “[c]ertainly . . . is not a preference rule
applied in Pakistan the same way Maryland courts once applied the
maternal preference.”175  Despite this disparity between child custody
schemes, the court refused to hold Pakistan’s child custody doctrine
168. Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 422, 947 A.2d 489, 500 (2008) (explaining that
under Pakistani law, “there is no equitable division of marital property . . . unless the marital
‘contract’ so provides” (emphasis added)).
169. See id. at 411, 947 A.2d at 494.
170. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 8-201(e)(3)(iii), 8-205(b)(11) (LexisNexis 2006).
While a court may determine “marital property” and then transfer ownership of that prop-
erty to the other spouse to arrive at a “fair and equitable” award upon divorce, see id. § 8-
205(b)(11), marital property does not include property “excluded by a valid agreement”
between spouses, id. § 8-201(e)(3)(iii).
171. Cf. Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, 311 Md. 387, 389–90, 393, 535 A.2d 466, 467, 469
(1988) (finding that Maryland’s public policy against gambling debts was insufficient to
preclude enforcement of a New Jersey gambling contract and explaining that “the public
policy [of another state] must be very strong and not merely a situation in which Maryland
law is different from the law of another jurisdiction”); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C.
Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 187, 190–91, 498 A.2d 605, 607–09 (1985) (finding that Mary-
land public policy prevented the court from enforcing an indemnity provision in a Penn-
sylvania contract because Maryland statute expressly voided the type of contract at issue,
while Pennsylvania “tolerated” such provisions under its common law).
172. 108 Md. App. 284, 671 A.2d 988 (1996).
173. See id. at 316–17, 671 A.2d at 1003–04 (explaining that although Pakistan strongly
prefers paternal custody and Maryland lacks a parental preference, the Pakistani doctrine
governing child custody was not “repugnant” to State public policy); see also infra notes
175–176 and accompanying text. R
174. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. R
175. Id. at 317–18 & n.9, 671 A.2d at 1004–05 & n.9 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
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repugnant to Maryland public policy.176  It is curious that the Malik II
court upheld Pakistan’s child custody doctrine, which is historically
and presently contrary to Maryland law, while the Aleem court declined
to recognize Pakistan’s title-based scheme, the result of which a
couple may accomplish under present Maryland law.
While the Telnikoff court warned that “recognition of English def-
amation judgments could well lead to a wholesale circumvention of
fundamental public policy in Maryland and the rest of the country,”177
such a concern is not raised by this case.  If the Aleem court had
granted comity to Irfan’s talaq and found that Pakistani law governed
distribution of the parties’ marital assets,178 then his pension would
not have been marital property subject to equitable distribution.179
Instead, under Pakistani law, Irfan’s pension would have followed title
so that Farah could not claim it.180  This title-based result would not
circumvent Maryland public policy, however, because Maryland ex-
plicitly authorizes title-based disposition of property upon divorce.181
Maryland would not have been alone in refusing to invoke the
public policy exception when determining whether to grant comity to
a Pakistani divorce where property would follow title.  For example, in
Chaudry v. Chaudry,182 the New Jersey Superior Court held that public
policy would not preclude the court from granting comity to the hus-
band’s talaq,183 and that the wife was not entitled to equitable distribu-
tion of property.184  The court found that the Pakistani marriage
contract had no provision that gave the wife an interest in her hus-
176. Id. at 317, 671 A.2d at 1004 (“This, however, does not mean that [Pakistan’s child
custody doctrine] is therefore ‘repugnant to Maryland public policy.’”).
177. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 601, 702 A.2d 230, 250 (1997).  The court
underscored that Maryland public policy strongly encourages the unfettered expression of
ideas and opinions. Id. at 602, 702 A.2d at 251 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
178. The Aleem court would have been statutorily entitled to apply Maryland law, how-
ever. See infra Part IV.C.
179. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 411, 947 A.2d 489, 494 (2008).
180. See id. (“[U]pon the dissolution of the marriage, the property follows the possessor
of its title.”).
181. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 8-201(e)(3)(iii), 8-205(b)(11) (LexisNexis 2006)
(providing that “marital property,” which is subject to equitable division, does not include
property “excluded by valid agreement”); Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 561, 865 A.2d
563, 577 (2005) (explaining that the 1978 Marital Property Act of Maryland “allow[s] par-
ties to agree ‘what property is not to be considered marital property or family use personal
property’ and thus ‘control the distribution of property upon divorce’” (quoting Frey v.
Frey, 298 Md. 552, 562, 471 A.2d 705, 710 (1984))); see also supra Part II.C.
182. 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
183. See id. at 1005.  Hanif performed talaq at a Pakistani consulate in New York. Id. at
1004.
184. Id. at 1006.
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band’s property.185  Additionally, aside from Maryland, many jurisdic-
tions allow parties to enter into valid agreements to prevent a court
from dividing property upon divorce.186  Thus, Pakistan’s title-based
property disposition scheme embedded in Irfan’s talaq is not repug-
nant to Maryland public policy.187
2. The Aleem Court’s Criticism of Talaq Was Improperly Broad
In denying comity to Irfan’s talaq, the Aleem court inappropriately
broadened its analysis and criticized Irfan’s talaq as a general protocol
rather than properly focusing on the effect of talaq on property disposi-
tion between spouses.  Irfan asked the Court of Appeals to determine
whether the lower court should have granted comity to his talaq when
Pakistan and Maryland use “different default rules” for property dispo-
sition upon divorce.188  The Aleem court reiterated that the central is-
sue in this case was whether Irfan’s pension plan was “marital
property” subject to equitable distribution, thus entitling Farah to half
of it.189  Instead of focusing on Pakistan’s “default rules” for property
disposition, however, the court also examined the much broader insti-
tution of talaq itself.190 The court explained that Irfan’s talaq contra-
vened Maryland public policy because it violated state constitutional
provisions191 and deprived the wife of due process.192
185. Id. The court reasoned enforcing the contract under Pakistani law would not vio-
late public policy, since the Chaudrys married and negotiated the contract in Pakistan. Id.
186. See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., PROPERTY DIVISION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS: A
FIFTY STATE GUIDE § 13.01 (2003) (“In the overwhelming majority of states, both antenup-
tial and separation agreements are enforceable, whether they provide for spousal support
after divorce or for settlement of the spouses’ property rights or both.”); see, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-113(2)(d) (West 2005) (providing that spouses may exclude “mari-
tal property” by valid agreement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16-a(II)(k) (2007) (noting
that property is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce unless the value of that
property is “allocated by a valid prenuptial contract”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-501 (West
2005) (providing that parties may enter into binding prenuptial agreements concerning
property owned by either spouse).
187. Indeed, the Aleem court never expressly classified Irfan’s talaq as “repugnant” in its
opinion. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 404–26, 947 A.2d 489, 489–502 (2008).  Moreo-
ver, the circuit court explained that it “[did] not find anything suspect about [the Aleems’
marital] contract,” but that nothing in the contract prevented dividing the property at
issue.  Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663, 681, 931 A.2d 1123, 1134 (2007).
188. Aleem, 404 Md. at 408, 947 A.2d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. at 411–12, 947 A.2d at 494. But see id. at 408 n.13, 947 A.2d at 491 n.13 (“These
questions raise broader issues than questions limited to the Pakistani marriage contract [in
this case].”).
190. See id. at 421–23, 947 A.2d at 500–01.
191. Id. at 422–23, 947 A.2d at 500–01 (explaining that talaq violates the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights guarantee of equality between the sexes because, under Islamic law, only
a husband may utilize talaq against his wife unless he gives her permission to do so in the
marriage contract).
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The court, however, should not have analyzed Pakistani law so
broadly because neither talaq as a procedure nor the validity of Irfan’s
particular talaq was at issue.  The Court of Special Appeals pointed out
that it was unnecessary to decide whether Maryland would recognize
talaq as a divorce, because this case concerned only whether the Pakis-
tani divorce served “as a bar to the equitable division of [Irfan’s] pen-
sion.”193  Likewise, the Court of Special Appeals observed that its
evaluation of Pakistani law applied only to enforcing Irfan’s talaq on
property rights under Maryland law, not whether a court would recog-
nize Irfan’s talaq as a divorce.194  Thus, the Aleem court’s evaluation of
talaq was unnecessarily broad and has no bearing on whether the
court should have granted comity to Irfan’s talaq.
Even if it had been appropriate to analyze talaq itself, the court’s
criticism of this protocol under the lens of gender equality under-
mines its discussion on property disposition: Talaq does not discrimi-
nate between the sexes when it comes to division of property upon
divorce.195  Although a Pakistani wife cannot divorce her husband un-
less he gives her permission to do so in the marriage contract—a prin-
ciple that undisputedly violates Maryland public policy—property will
follow title regardless of whether the owner is the husband or the wife,
as the Aleem court itself explained.196  Because title, not gender, con-
trols upon divorce, the effect of talaq on property disposition is not
repugnant to Maryland’s public policy of gender equality.197
192. Id. at 423, 947 A.2d at 501 (noting that talaq violates a wife’s due process rights
because she would never be able to succeed on a divorce action when her husband could
simply perform talaq before she could fully litigate her claim).
193. Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663, 678, 931 A.2d 1123, 1132 (2007).  The court
explained that this inquiry was unnecessary because neither Irfan nor Farah objected to
the dissolution of their marriage. Id. at 678 & n.8, 931 A.2d at 1132 & n.8.
194. Id. at 678 & n.8, 931 A.2d at 1132 & n.8; see also supra note 193 and accompanying R
text.
195. See Aleem, 404 Md. at 411, 947 A.2d at 494 (explaining that property follows title
upon divorce to the person who owns that property, regardless of gender).
196. Id.
197. Assuming, arguendo, that Pakistan’s gender-neutral title-based property rule has a
disproportionate impact on women, a court must nevertheless find that there exists invidi-
ous intent behind a law before deeming it discriminatory.  Haegyung Cho, Incarcerated Wo-
men and Abuse: The Crime Connection and the Lack of Treatment in Correctional Facilities, 14 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 137, 152 (2004) (explaining that a party challenging a
facially neutral gender law that has a disparate impact on one gender must prove that the
law was motivated by the intent to discriminate).  As a historical matter, the rule that
neither spouse in a Muslim marriage acquires an interest in the other’s property was the
result of a Quaranic reform to give women the right to own, manage, and possess her
property in event of divorce. ESPOSITO, supra note 96, at 23. R
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B. The Aleem Court Lowered the Threshold that Maryland Courts
Must Pass to Deny Comity to Foreign Judgments
In rendering its decision, the Aleem court made it easier for a Ma-
ryland court to deny comity to a foreign judgment in the future.  Al-
though the court properly looked to State public policy when
analyzing Pakistan’s property division scheme, the court failed to use
the appropriate standard: A foreign judgment must be repugnant to
public policy in order for a court to deny comity to that judgment.198
Regarding property disposition, Irfan’s talaq is not repugnant to Mary-
land public policy.199  Nevertheless, the court denied comity to his
talaq primarily because of its disagreement with Pakistan’s title-based
law.200
Post-Aleem, Maryland courts will find it easier to overcome the
presumption that foreign judgments are entitled to comity201 on the
basis of subjective and even results-based considerations.  In this case,
the Aleem court appeared driven to rule in favor of the unquestionably
sympathetic wife, Farah, even if it had to divert from the “repugnant”
standard.  Few would argue that after spending twenty years of her
married life in Maryland, Farah was not entitled to her share of mari-
tal property under Maryland law.202  Future cases, however, may not
appear so dramatic.  Maryland courts now enjoy a lower, more subjec-
tive threshold to cross when denying comity to foreign judgments in
all cases, which may tempt courts to color their decisions with shades
of arbitrariness in order to reach a results-based decision.203  The pos-
sibility of this temptation is not unrealistic, as most American judges
are already unfamiliar with foreign law.204  A results-oriented trend in
198. See supra notes 157–165 and accompanying text. R
199. See supra Part IV.A.
200. See Aleem, 404 Md. at 425, 947 A.2d at 502 (explaining the court “shall afford no
comity to those Pakistani statutes” providing that property follows title upon divorce).  The
court also denied comity to Irfan’s talaq on due process grounds, but noted that this was
only an “additional reason.” Id. at 425–26, 947 A.2d at 502.
201. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895) (explaining that, under the doc-
trine of comity, foreign judgments serve as prima facie evidence of the merit of the plain-
tiff’s claim).
202. See Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663, 667, 931 A.2d 1123, 1126 (2007) (noting
that while Irfan worked at the World Bank, Farah took care of him, their children, and the
household).
203. Cf. Thomas L. Jipping, Winners and Losers Versus How You Play the Game: Should Ideol-
ogy Drive Judicial Selection?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2002) (explaining that a results-
oriented approach vis-a`-vis judicial selection invites several dangers, including “in-
creas[ing] potential for and appearance of biased decision-making and thus erod[ing]
public trust in the fundamental fairness of our justice system” (alterations in original)).
204. Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
457, 467 (2001) (noting that the judiciary’s unfamiliarity with international law is coupled
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comity cases would be particularly alarming because it would allow the
Maryland judiciary to deny comity to those foreign judgments that
failed to seriously contravene notions of fundamental justice in the
State.205
The denial of comity to foreign judgments is a drastic remedy
because it cuts against the notion that comity is grounded in “mutual-
ity and reciprocity.”206  Because a nation grants comity to a foreign
judgment by its own volition, rather than by mandate,207 reciprocity is
a significant consideration that nations take into account when con-
sidering whether to recognize a foreign judgment.208  The lower Aleem
threshold opens the door for enabling foreign nations to deny comity
to Maryland judgments, a possibility that the Maryland Uniform For-
eign-Money Judgments Recognition Act—codifying the “repugnant”
factor—operated to prevent.209  From the days of Hilton, courts have
understood comity as “due regard . . . to international duty and conve-
with the difficulty of directly researching international law questions); Evan Criddle, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 451
(2004) (explaining that “[b]ecause judges are often unfamiliar with foreign contract law,
recourse to ‘general rules’ of contract law inevitably reflects an American-law bias”); David
F. Forte, Islamic Law in American Courts, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 31–33 (1983)
(explaining that American judges are “innate[ly] cautio[us] . . . in articulating foreign law”
and that they “rely heavily on expert witnesses” in cases involving Islamic legalities).  Nota-
bly, the Court of Special Appeals relied solely on Irfan’s expert witnesses to inform its
opinion of Pakistan’s title-based property disposition scheme. See Aleem, 175 Md. App. at
669–72, 931 A.2d at 1127–29.
205. Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel
Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1990 (1994) (explaining that United
States courts “reserve [the] drastic remedy [of refusing to enforce foreign judgments] for
those few cases in which a foreign judgment truly threatens notions of fundamental justice
in the enforcing state”).
206. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228 (observing that international law is based on the concepts of
“mutuality and reciprocity”).
207. See id. at 165–66 (stressing that comity is a “‘voluntary act of the nation by which it
is offered’” and promotes a “‘friendly intercourse’” between sovereignties (quoting Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839))).
208. Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 175, 389 A.2d 413, 417 (1978).
209. See Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-704(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining that a foreign judgment “need
not be recognized” where, inter alia, the judgment is “repugnant to the public policy of the
State”); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 607, 702 A.2d 230, 253 (1997) (Chasanow,
J., dissenting) (stressing that the Maryland Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recogni-
tion Act “gives a state discretion to subordinate its own public policy in favor of uniformity
and the importance of comity among nations”); Wolff, 40 Md. App. at 175, 389 A.2d at 417
(noting that because reciprocity is an important consideration in determining whether
courts of one nation will recognize the judgments of another nation, “the certainty of
recognition of those judgments provided for by the [Maryland Uniform Foreign-Money
Judgments Recognition] Act will hopefully facilitate recognition of similar United States’
judgments abroad”).
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nience,”210 and the Aleem court’s lower standard only dilutes Mary-
land’s interest in comity and international good will.211  It is curious
that the court would weaken this important interest in an analysis that
rejected the Pakistani divorce doctrine unnecessarily, as talaq as a pro-
tocol was not even before the court.212
Aleem’s lowered standard is especially troublesome because it re-
places a concrete standard with an ambiguous one.213  Because “re-
pugnant” no longer appears to be the standard a court must follow to
deny a foreign judgment,214 the Maryland judiciary may follow the
Aleem court’s generally articulated “substantial conflict” rationale.215
This standard, however, raises at least two potential concerns: (1)
courts may be faced with foreign judgments that Maryland law does
not already speak to, foreclosing the opportunity for conflict; and (2)
“substantial” is a broad, undefined standard in itself.216  The unde-
fined Aleem standard will exacerbate the frustration that state courts
face in foreign law cases.  For example, when interpreting Muslim
contracts, United States courts already tend to apply domestic princi-
ples unevenly because the vast interpretation of Muslim legal concepts
clashes against the goal of Western judiciary to inject predictability in
the law.217  Although “repugnant” is not a bright-line term in itself, it
210. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64.
211. See Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 616, 702 A.2d at 257 (emphasizing Maryland’s interest in
“international good will, comity, and res judicata fostered by recognition of foreign judg-
ments”); Forte, supra note 204, at 3 (“[D]omestic courts apply principles of comity and R
recognize foreign law as a matter of custom.”).
212. See supra Part IV.A.2.
213. Cf. Mathieu Blackston, California’s Unfair Competition Law—Making Sure the Avenger
Is Not Guilty of the Greater Crime, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1833, 1865–66 & n.157 (2004) (not-
ing that undefined standards may lead to unpredictable decisions when determining “fair”
business conduct); Erin Madden, Seeing the Science for the Trees: Employing Daubert Standards
to Assess the Adequacy of National Forest Management Under the National Forest Management Act,
18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 321, 347 (2003) (explaining that governmental plans grounded on
undefined standards are “arbitrary and capricious”).
214. See supra Part IV.A.1.
215. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 425, 947 A.2d 489, 502 (2008) (explaining that
the “default” rules of property disposition upon divorce in Pakistan and Maryland con-
flicted to such a degree that the court could not grant comity to Irfan’s talaq without violat-
ing Maryland public policy).
216. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means
Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 667 (2005) (criticizing the “substantial
abuse” standard in bankruptcy law as “inherently vague,” leading to “disparate [judicial]
interpretation”); Mark S. Pincus, Circuit Split or a Matter of Semantics? The Supreme Court’s
Upcoming Decision on Rule 10b-5 “Scheme Liability” and Its Implications for Tax Shelter Fraud
Litigation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 445 (2007) (criticizing the “substantial participation”
test as vague and overly broad).
217. See, e.g., Emily L. Thompson & F. Soniya Yunus, Choice of Laws or Choice of Culture:
How Western Nations Treat the Islamic Marriage Contract in Domestic Courts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J.
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alleviates the danger of patchy legal application in comity cases be-
cause, as an initial matter, it establishes a high threshold for courts to
meet.218
C. By Grounding Its Decision in a Jurisdictional Analysis, the Aleem
Court Could Have Reached the Same Result Without
Discussing Comity
If the Aleem court had focused solely on whether to apply the
property laws of Maryland or Pakistan when determining Farah’s right
to Irfan’s pension, it could have reached the same outcome without
engaging in a troublesome comity analysis.219  Regardless of whether
Maryland would recognize Irfan’s talaq as a divorce, which was not at
issue,220 Maryland had the jurisdictional authority to classify Irfan’s
pension as “marital property” subject to equitable distribution.  A Ma-
ryland court may exercise its authority even after a foreign court
grants an annulment or divorce if the following factors are satisfied:
(1) one of the parties was domiciled in Maryland when the foreign
action commenced; and (2) the court in the foreign jurisdiction
lacked or did not exercise either personal jurisdiction over the Mary-
land-domiciled party or jurisdiction over the property at issue.221  In
this case, both conditions were met.
The Maryland circuit court met the first prong because Irfan and
Farah were domiciled in the State.  A “domicile” is the place in which
“a person has been physically present and that the person regards as
home.”222  When Irfan performed talaq, he and Farah were domiciliar-
ies of Maryland because they had resided in the State for over twenty
361, 369–70 (2007) (explaining that because Muslim communities interpret Islamic law
quite differently, opinions on each point of law can vary widely, causing constant struggles
for United States courts as they confront the dichotomy between such diversity in Muslim
legal principles and the desire of the Western judiciary to engage in consistent decision-
making).
218. See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 612, 702 A.2d 230, 255 (1997) (Chasa-
now, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “‘repugnant’” comity standard “‘is high, and in-
frequently met’” (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986))).
219. Indeed, courts rarely decline comity on the grounds of public policy; instead,
judges look at a choice-of-laws analysis based on the recognizing jurisdiction’s interest in
the parties or the transaction itself.  Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recogni-
tion of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1670
(1968).
220. See Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663, 678, 931 A.2d 1123, 1132 (2007).
221. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-212 (LexisNexis 2006); see also supra Part II.C.
222. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (8th ed. 2004).
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years.223  The lower court added that Farah was domiciled in the State
because she was a permanent resident of Maryland.224
The trial court also satisfied the second statutory condition be-
cause Pakistan did not have personal jurisdiction over Farah or over
Irfan’s pension plan.  Farah’s response to the chairman of the arbitra-
tion council in Pakistan, in which she objected to jurisdiction, was in-
sufficient to grant Pakistan personal jurisdiction over Farah.225
Moreover, when Irfan filed an answer to Farah’s complaint seeking a
limited divorce in a Maryland circuit court, he did not raise any juris-
dictional defenses relating to his person or property.226
Indeed, as the Court of Special Appeals found, Maryland had a
nexus with the Aleems’ marriage sufficient to require an equitable dis-
tribution of marital property.227  The Aleems resided in Maryland for
over twenty years, their children were born and raised in the State,
and Farah had become a permanent resident of Maryland.228  This
case is distinguishable from Chaudry v. Chaudry, in which the New
Jersey Superior Court upheld a Pakistani talaq that foreclosed equita-
ble distribution of property to the wife because there was no “ade-
quate nexus of the marriage to [New Jersey].”229  In Chaudry, the wife
resided in New Jersey for only two years during her thirteen-year mar-
riage before returning permanently to Pakistan without her
husband.230
Because Maryland satisfied both statutory conditions and Irfan’s
pension was entirely marital property, the Maryland trial court had
the authority to subject Irfan’s pension to equitable distribution.231
The Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals affirmed this
223. Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 411, 947 A.2d 489, 494 (2008).
224. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 678 n.7, 931 A.2d at 1132 n.7.
225. Id. at 676–77, 931 A.2d at 1131 (finding that Farah’s “courteously phrased objec-
tion to jurisdiction, in the nature of a special appearance,” before the arbitration council
was not equivalent to a general appearance that would have allowed Pakistan to take per-
sonal jurisdiction over her).
226. Id. at 667, 931 A.2d at 1126.
227. Id. at 676, 931 A.2d at 1131.
228. Id.
229. Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
230. Id. at 1004.
231. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 671 n.5, 931 A.2d at 1128 n.5 (determining that “the marital
share of [Irfan’s] pension was 100%” since Irfan worked at the World Bank during the
marriage). See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-212 (LexisNexis 2006) (explaining that if
both conditions are met, a Maryland court may “exercise the powers under this subtitle”);
id. § 8-205(b) (providing that courts may consider a variety of factors, such as the monetary
and nonmonetary contributions of each party, when determining an equitable monetary
award or transferring property between spouses); see also supra Part II.C.
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point.232  As the lower court explained, if a sister state had ruled that
Irfan did not have to equitably divide his pension, Maryland would
not have to grant full faith and credit to that aspect of the state’s judg-
ment.233  Because “a law of a foreign country that [forecloses equita-
ble distribution of property] does not require enforcement by
comity,”234 Maryland could have easily declined to enforce that aspect
of Irfan’s talaq that mandated distribution under Pakistan’s title-based
property scheme and applied Maryland law instead.  Even if the Aleem
court had recognized the Pakistani divorce, the court still had the au-
thority to equitably divide Irfan’s pension under Maryland law, just as
the trial court in Randolph v. Randolph235 granted the wife a monetary
award under Maryland law after Virginia granted a divorce.236  Thus,
the Aleem court could have avoided its flawed comity discussion by
grounding its decision to grant Farah half of Irfan’s pension based on
its own well-settled law.
V. CONCLUSION
In Aleem v. Aleem, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied comity
to Irfan’s talaq and affirmed the lower court’s holding that his wife was
entitled to an equitable distribution of his pension under Maryland
law.237  In awarding Irfan’s wife a marital interest in his pension under
a comity analysis, the court erred because it did not demonstrate that
Pakistan’s property division scheme was repugnant to State public pol-
icy.238  In declining to grant comity to Irfan’s talaq based on the ele-
ment of property disposition upon divorce, the court troublingly
lowered the bar that future Maryland courts must reach in order to
deny comity to foreign judgments.239 Aleem’s relaxed standard creates
the risk of a results-oriented trend in comity cases and allows the Ma-
ryland judiciary to easily deny recognition to foreign judgments, effec-
tively jeopardizing the State’s own judgments from being afforded
comity by other nations.240  If the court had relied on Maryland’s
232. See Aleem v. Aleem, 404 Md. 404, 426, 947 A.2d 489, 502 (2008); Aleem, 175 Md.
App. at 676, 931 A.2d at 1131.
233. Aleem, 175 Md. App. at 678–79, 931 A.2d at 1132–33.
234. Id. at 679, 931 A.2d at 1133 (citing J.M.H., Annotation, Conclusiveness as to Merits of
Judgment of Courts of Foreign Country, 46 A.L.R. 439, 440–41 (1927)).
235. 67 Md. App. 577, 508 A.2d 996 (1986).
236. Id. at 584, 508 A.2d at 999
237. Aleem, 404 Md. at 424–26, 947 A.2d at 501–02.
238. See supra Part IV.A.
239. See supra Part IV.B.
240. See supra Part IV.B.
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jurisdictional authority to equitably divide marital property upon di-
vorce, the court could have reached the same result while avoiding a
defective comity analysis.241
241. See supra Part IV.C.
